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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
KASAN SANDERS a/k/a Kasan Cox
Kasan Sanders,
                   Appellant                   
_________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 04-cr-00516)
District Judge:  The Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 4, 2006
BEFORE: McKEE, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed December 18, 2006)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
2NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Nicole Bowman called Philadelphia police and reported a domestic disturbance
involving her ex-boyfriend “Michael.” Philadelphia Police Officer Carlos Nieves and his
partner responded and arrived at Bowman’s residence at 1319 North 11th Street in North
Philadelphia. Bowman told Nieves that Michael, carrying a gun and wearing a jeff cap
and all-white clothing, had just walked southbound toward the intersection of 11th Street
and Girard Avenue. As Nieves left Bowman’s apartment, other police officers arrived
and told him they’d just spotted a man fitting Bowman’s description on the corner of
11th and Girard. 
The man the officers saw was appellant Kasan Sanders. When Nieves arrived at
11th and Girard, he stopped Sanders and conducted a Terry frisk. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1967). Nieves discovered a loaded .38 caliber revolver tucked inside Sanders’
waistband and arrested him. A federal grand jury indicted Sanders and charged him with
one count of violating 18 U.S.C. §922(g) as a felon in possession of a firearm.   
Sanders filed a motion to suppress the revolver and ammunition, contending
Nieves lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him. Subsequently, Sanders and the
government reached an agreement pursuant to which Sanders admitted the factual
elements of the indictment and agreed to a stipulated trial should his motion to suppress
be denied. The government in turn agreed Sanders would be entitled to at least a two
point adjustment for acceptance of responsibility upon sentencing. 
3At the suppression hearing, the government presented Officer Nieves to testify.
Sanders presented five witnesses and documentary evidence to impeach Nieves’
testimony. The district court denied Sanders’ motion and admitted the revolver and
ammunition into evidence. Sanders waived his right to trial by jury and the court
conducted a short, stipulated bench trial that afternoon. Sanders was found guilty as
charged.
At sentencing, the parties clashed over whether Sanders deserved a three-point
adjustment for his acceptance of responsibility for the crime under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines §3E1.1(b). The government agreed to a two point reduction under §3E1.1(a),
but refused to move for a third point under §3E1.1(b). Sanders contended he deserved the
third point because he had admitted his guilt from the start of the proceedings. The court
reduced Sanders’ offense level by two points, but declined to reduce it by a third point
because, the court explained, “the Government has not filed a motion permitting me to
depart downward the additional point....” The court sentenced Sanders to 63 months in




4On appeal, Sanders contends the government vindictively refused to move for a
§3E1.1(b) departure and that the district court erred when it concluded it could not order
the departure absent a government motion. §3E1.1 provides: 
a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. 
b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense
level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or
greater, and upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own
misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of
guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources
efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3E1.1(a-b)(2006). 
In relevant part, the Commentary to §3E1.1(b) states: 
Because the Government is in the best position to determine whether the
defendant has assisted authorities in a manner that avoids preparing for
trial, an adjustment under subsection (b) may only be granted upon a formal
motion by the Government at the time of sentencing. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §3E1.1(b) & cmt. n.6 (2006)(citing the PROTECT
Act of 2003 §401(g), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 STAT. 671-72).
Despite the government’s broad discretion under this provision, district courts
have the power to review a prosecutor’s refusal to move for a downward departure and to
grant a remedy if they find the refusal a) was based on an unconstitutional motive, such as
race or religion, or b) lacked a rational relationship to any legitimate government
objective. United States v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 185-186 (1992); United States v.
Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 1998). However, in recognition of the
government’s prerogative, the scope of a district court’s review here is “extremely
5limited” absent a plea agreement. United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir.
1998). 
The government may violate due process if it refuses to move for a departure
vindictively. United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1121 (1994). Sanders carries the burden of proving prosecutorial vindictiveness,
by adducing evidence of actual vindictiveness or evidence which generates a
presumption of vindictiveness. Paramo, 998 F.2d at 1220 (internal citations omitted).  
Sanders’ Paramo claim lacks merit entirely. Well before the suppression hearing,
the Government maintained it would not move for a §3E1.1(b) departure if Sanders
sought suppression. In Paramo, we recognized a prosecutor does not violate due process
when he threatens serious charges to induce a guilty plea and then carries out that threat
after the defendant refuses to cooperate. Paramo, 998 F.2d at 1221 (citing Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978)). Similarly, the Government’s threat to refuse a
§3E1.1(b) departure, and its adherence to that threat, are “inevitable and permissible”
attributes of a judicial system “which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.”
Id. (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364).
Sanders allowed the government to avoid voir dire, jury instructions and jury
selection, but he forced the government to litigate the essential element of a §922(g)(1)
offense – Sanders’ possession of a firearm – and his only arguable defense. In doing so,
Sanders compelled the government to prepare and examine Officer Nieves and to cross-
6examine five defense witnesses. As a result, the government essentially tried Sanders at
the suppression hearing. United States v. Rogers, 129 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997)(per curiam).
The government reasonably concluded Sanders did not permit it or the court “to allocate
their resources efficiently.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3E1.1(b) (2006).
B.
Sanders argues his sentence is unreasonable because the district court refused to
grant a variance comparable to §3E1.1(b) and failed to adequately explain the rationale
behind his sentence. 
District judges now must follow a three-step analysis in sentencing criminal
defendants. United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). The district judge
must 1) continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as he would
have before United States v. Booker; 2) formally rule on the parties’ motions, stating on
the record whether he is granting a departure and how that departure affects the
Guidelines calculation; and 3) exercise his discretion by considering the relevant
§3553(a) factors. Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247. At step three, the sentencing record should
demonstrate the judge considered the §3553(a) factors and any sentencing grounds
properly raised by the parties which have recognized legal merit and factual support in
the record. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332. However, the judge need not discuss every
argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit. Cooper, 437 F.3d at
329.   
7We conclude the district court followed the proper analysis and that Sanders’
sentence is reasonable. The court carefully calculated Sanders’ Guidelines sentence and
formally ruled on the parties’ motions with respect to Guidelines departures. At Gunter
step three, it acknowledged the Guidelines are advisory, stated the relevant §3553(a)
factors and considered the totality of the circumstances. Importantly, the court considered
Sanders’ personal circumstances when it chose not to impose a fine and reduced Sanders’
sentence to credit him for time served because the Bureau of Prisons did not intend to do
so. Appendix at 226; see United States v. Charles, -- F.3d -- , 2006 WL3231396 (3d Cir.
2006). 
Although the district court did not expressly rule on Sanders’ request for a
variance, we can infer it concluded Sanders’ claim lacked merit. Indeed, Sanders
provided no evidence to suggest he was entitled to a variance comparable to the
§3E1.1(b) departure.
III. 
8The district court properly calculated Sanders’ Guidelines sentence, expressly
ruled on the parties’ respective departure motions and exercised its discretion prudently.
We will affirm Sanders’ sentence.   
